Categorizing threat : building and using a generic threat matrix. by Woodard, Laura et al.
 SANDIA REPORT 
SAND2007-5791 
Unlimited Release 
Printed September 2007 
Categorizing Threat 
Building and Using a Generic Threat Matrix 
David P. Duggan, Sherry R. Thomas, Cynthia K. K. Veitch, and Laura Woodard 
Prepared by 
Sandia National Laboratories 
Albuquerque, New Mexico  87185 and Livermore, California  94550 
 
Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation,  
a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy’s 
National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
 
Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categorizing Threat: Building and Using a Generic Threat Matrix 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of 
Energy by Sandia Corporation. 
 
NOTICE:  This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of 
the United States Government.  Neither the United States Government, nor any agency 
thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their 
employees, make any warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or 
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, 
apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represent that its use would not infringe 
privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or 
service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily 
constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States 
Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors.  The 
views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United 
States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors. 
 
Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from 
the best available copy. 
 
Available to DOE and DOE contractors from 
 U.S. Department of Energy 
 Office of Scientific and Technical Information 
 P.O. Box 62 
 Oak Ridge, TN  37831 
 
 Telephone: (865) 576-8401 
 Facsimile: (865) 576-5728 
 E-Mail: reports@adonis.osti.gov 
 Online ordering: http://www.osti.gov/bridge 
 
Available to the public from 
 U.S. Department of Commerce 
 National Technical Information Service 
 5285 Port Royal Rd. 
 Springfield, VA  22161 
 
 Telephone: (800) 553-6847 
 Facsimile: (703) 605-6900 
 E-Mail: orders@ntis.fedworld.gov 
 Online order: http://www.ntis.gov/help/ordermethods.asp?loc=7-4-0#online 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SAND2007-5791 
Unlimited Release 
Printed September 2007 
Categorizing Threat 
Building and Using a Generic Threat Matrix 
David P. Duggan 
Networked Systems Survivability and Assurance 
Sherry R. Thomas, Cynthia K. K. Veitch, and Laura Woodard 
Center for Cyber Defenders 
Networked Systems Survivability and Assurance 
Sandia National Laboratories 
P.O. Box 5800 
Albuquerque, New Mexico  87185 
Abstract 
The key piece of knowledge necessary for building defenses capable of withstanding or 
surviving cyber and kinetic attacks is an understanding of the capabilities posed by threats to 
a government, function, or system. With the number of threats continuing to increase, it is no 
longer feasible to enumerate the capabilities of all known threats and then build defenses 
based on those threats that are considered, at the time, to be the most relevant. Exacerbating 
the problem for critical infrastructure entities is the fact that the majority of detailed threat 
information for higher-level threats is held in classified status and is not available for general 
use, such as the design of defenses and the development of mitigation strategies. To reduce 
the complexity of analyzing threat, the threat space must first be reduced. This is achieved by 
taking the continuous nature of the threat space and creating an abstraction that allows the 
entire space to be grouped, based on measurable attributes, into a small number of distinctly 
different levels. The work documented in this report is an effort to create such an abstraction. 
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Executive Summary 
The key piece of knowledge necessary for building defenses capable of withstanding or 
surviving cyber and kinetic attacks is an understanding of the capabilities posed by threats to 
a government, function, or system. With the number of threats continuing to increase, it is no 
longer feasible to enumerate the capabilities of all known threats and then build defenses 
based on those threats that are considered, at the time, to be the most relevant. Exacerbating 
the problem for critical infrastructure entities is the fact that the majority of detailed threat 
information for higher-level threats is held in a classified status and is not available for 
general use, such as the design of defenses and the development of mitigation strategies. To 
reduce the complexity of analyzing threat, the threat space must first be reduced. This is 
achieved by taking the continuous nature of that threat space and creating an abstraction that 
allows the entire space to be grouped, based on measurable attributes, into a small number of 
distinctly different levels. The work documented in this report is an effort to create such an 
abstraction. 
The purpose of this threat characterization research and threat matrix development is to aid in 
the creation of a comprehensive threat analysis framework that enables the objective 
determination of threat capabilities and supports the ability to identify and prioritize 
expenditures to mitigate the effects from a class of threats, all in an unclassified venue for 
use by critical infrastructure providers and utility owners. One of the primary activities 
necessary to move classified threat information to the unclassified information environment 
is the development of generic threat profiles that can characterize many different levels of 
threat without associating a name with a classified ability. This unclassified threat 
characterization must be able to bin a full spectrum of threat capability to allow analysts from 
the classified threat environment to map the characterization of an “unnamed” threat to an 
equivalent bin, or level, of threat in the unclassified threat environment. This will then allow 
analysts in the unclassified environment to identify potential attack paths that could be 
supported by the asserted capability and identify proper mitigation steps to thwart attacks. 
This work describes a set of generic threat profiles that can be used to identify and 
characterize the different levels of adversaries and their related capabilities. These profiles 
enable unclassified actionable threat information to be distributed to potential stakeholders 
such as critical infrastructure providers and utility owners. The U.S. government and critical 
infrastructure industries can use the generic threat matrix to communicate about possible 
threats. Intelligence organizations can categorize each known threat group into a discrete 
level of the matrix, to communicate the threat to industry. Through this sharing of actionable 
threat information, critical infrastructure assets will become more secure and utility owners 
and operators will become more aware of potential vulnerabilities in their related 
infrastructure.  
This report begins with an introduction to the history and significance of threat analysis. 
Section 2 describes the approach used in this work to identify threat attributes and develop a 
generic threat matrix. The definition and scale of threat attributes is described in detail in 
Section 3. In addition, the generic threat matrix is introduced and followed by a discussion of 
its validity and applicability. The report closes with a conclusion and recommendations for 
use of the matrix by government organizations and critical infrastructure entities.
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1 Introduction 
The key piece of knowledge necessary for building defenses capable of withstanding or 
surviving cyber and kinetic attacks is an understanding of the capabilities posed by threats to 
a government, function, or system. With the number of threats continuing to increase, it is no 
longer feasible to enumerate the capabilities of all known threats and then build defenses 
based on those threats that are considered, at the time, to be the most relevant. Exacerbating 
the problem for critical infrastructure providers and utility owners is the fact that the majority 
of detailed threat information for higher-level threats is held in a classified status and is not 
available for general use, such as the design of defenses and the development of mitigation 
strategies. To reduce the complexity of analyzing threat, the complexity of the threat space 
must first be reduced. This is achieved by taking the continuous nature of that threat space 
and creating an abstraction that allows the entire space to be grouped, based on measurable 
capabilities, into a small number of distinctly different levels. The work documented in this 
report is an effort to create such an abstraction. 
1.1 Background 
For more than two hundred years, the United States has defended itself from a variety of 
threats. For each new circumstance, it was required that the capabilities of the unique threat 
be ascertained and analyzed; the results were then used to develop strategies for, and 
implementations of, defenses. In those cases where threat capabilities or intent were not 
adequately identified, the country has had to contend with great losses, such as the events of 
Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. With the number of threats 
growing on a daily basis, it has become increasingly difficult to catalog the capabilities of 
each new threat.  When cyber methods are considered within the threat space, the complexity 
of threat characterization becomes even more complex. 
1.1.1 Description 
Threat can be characterized as one of three types: normal, abnormal, or malevolent. 
Documents on infrastructure and architectural surety,1 created from a physical framework 
perspective, define these categories of threat in the following way: 
• Normal Threat: An event or condition that affects the reliability of the day-to-day 
operations; for example, the mean time between failures or inefficient repair and 
replacement (maintenance) schedules to offset the effects of aging. 
• Abnormal Threat: A natural disaster, such as hurricane-force winds or earthquakes, 
resulting in the failure of structural steel frames. 
• Malevolent Threat: A manmade event or condition; for example, a bombing of a 
federal facility or the use of chemical and biological agents in terrorist attacks. 
Although these definitions were created to address threat to physical structures, all three 
threat types must be addressed for all systems. Normal and abnormal threats are addressed 
                                                 
1 Matalucci, R. V., & O’Connor, S. (2000). Infrastructure and Architectural SuretySM. Materials Research 
Society: When Materials Matter—Analyzing, Predicting and Preventing Disasters. 630, GG1.3.1-9. 
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from a safety or functional perspective, whereas malevolent threats must be addressed from a 
security perspective. 
This work specifically addresses only those threats considered to be malevolent, whether 
those threats use cyber, kinetic, or hybrid cyber-kinetic means. For the remainder of this 
paper, threat is defined as a malevolent actor, whether an organization or an individual, with 
a specific political, social, or personal goal and some level of capability and intention to 
oppose an established government, a private organization, or an accepted social norm. The 
goal of a threat is considered to be the threat’s overall intent, the end-result the threat is 
trying to achieve (e.g., the overthrow of a leading political party). In contrast, a threat’s 
objective is simply a task, such as a specific attack, that must be accomplished to progress 
toward the goal. 
Current threat analysis methods tend to concentrate on more subjective aspects of political 
and social motivation structures without identifying relevant objective characteristics that 
may be used to identify attacks each adversary might be able to perform. The method of 
threat categorization used in this work is not based on the threat’s motivation, goal, or 
objective. Instead, each threat is categorized into a generic threat level profile based on 
capability attributes, or characteristics, common to all threats. As part of an overall threat 
analysis framework2 being developed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), these generic 
profiles allow for actionable, or readily usable, threat information to be determined and 
distributed to key stakeholders. 
1.1.2 Historical Information 
With the move into the information age, a new form of weapon has emerged that enables an 
increased number of individuals and groups to become threats. Attacks are no longer just 
cyber attacks or kinetic attacks; there is now a hybrid form of attack that integrates both 
cyber and kinetic components. For example, a kinetic attack could be launched against a 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system that would damage or disable that 
system’s operation of physical processes, potentially endangering the general populace or 
causing severe economic damage to critical infrastructure assets3. In addition, the 
technological nature of our society and the easy access to diffuse information and 
communication enables more complex attacks and makes training readily available. There is 
need for a method of qualifying generic threats to any facility or system, as well as threats 
specific to cyber systems or physical facilities. 
The historical approach to dealing with threat by identifying each unique threat and learning 
its particular capabilities, then identifying protection mechanisms to be implemented, does 
not work well as the number of these threats increases. A new method for objective 
quantification of threat capabilities needs to be developed. This method must allow for the 
transfer of threat capability information to the unclassified domain in order to be of use to 
                                                 
2 Duggan, D. P., & Michalski, J. T. (2007). Threat analysis framework report, SAND2007-5792. Sandia 
National Laboratories. 
3 Stamp, J., Young, W., & DePoy, J. (2003). Common vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure control systems, 
SAND2003-1772C. Sandia National Laboratories. 
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critical infrastructure providers and utility owners, who operate mostly in an unclassified 
environment. 
1.1.3 Significance 
It is impractical and inefficient to continue chasing the “threat of the day” as is currently 
done. As part of an overall framework of threat analysis, the development of generic threat 
profiles will enable the design of mitigation strategies to simultaneously cover a larger 
number of threats, both known and unknown, based on threat capabilities. The sharing of 
these mitigation strategies with utility owners and operators will aid them in securing their 
critical infrastructure assets by identifying potential vulnerabilities in their related 
infrastructure. 
1.1.4 Literature Review 
The approach to threat categorization used for this work has not been found to exist in any 
prior Department of Energy (DOE) or other literature. However, there is a strong history of 
this type of approach within SNL. In 1999, shortly following President Clinton’s call for the 
development of a system for identifying and preventing major attacks to critical 
infrastructure,4 James Purvis authored a report on the need for a revision of sabotage 
categories, target types, and consequences and the development of a standardized risk 
assessment methodology for physical protection at nuclear power plants.5 Beginning in 2002, 
SNL researchers started to assess threats to all critical infrastructure assets. Work has been 
completed on approaches to critical infrastructure security,6 common vulnerabilities of 
control systems,7 threat-group dynamics,8 threat assessment,9,10 and information sharing.11 
Most recently, David Duggan has been focusing on developing generic profiles of cyber 
threats12 to industrial control systems;13 this work continues in the current project by 
extending the threat profiles to include both kinetic and cyber threats to any system.  
Similar to the work being performed at SNL, researchers from Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL) presented a methodology for vulnerability and risk assessment using the 
                                                 
4 The Clinton Administration’s policy on critical infrastructure protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63 
(NSC-63). (1998). 
5 Purvis, J. W. (1999). Sabotage at nuclear power plants, SAND99-1850C. Sandia National Laboratories. 
6 Baker, A. B., et al. (2002). A scalable systems approach for critical infrastructure security, SAND2002-0877. 
Sandia National Laboratories. 
7 Stamp, J., Young, W., & DePoy, J. (2003). Common vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure control systems, 
SAND2003-1772C. Sandia National Laboratories. 
8 Backus, G.A., & Glass, R. J. (2005). An agent-based model component to a framework for the analysis of 
terrorist-group dynamics, SAND2006-0860P. Sandia National Laboratories. 
9 Depoy, J., et al. (2006). Critical infrastructure systems of systems assessment methodology, SAND2006-6399. 
Sandia National Laboratories. 
10 Merkle, P. B. (2006). Extended defense systems: I. Adversary-defender modeling grammar for vulnerability 
analysis and threat assessment, SAND2006-1484. Sandia National Laboratories. 
11 Hayden, N. K., & Craft, R. L. (2003). The Knowledge Network (KnowNet): Deepening the nation’s 
understanding of terrorist behavior, SAND2004-0476P. Sandia National Laboratories. 
12 Duggan, D. P. (2005). Generic threat profiles, SAND2005-5411. Sandia National Laboratories. 
13 Duggan, D. P. (2006). Generic attack approaches for industrial control systems, SAND2006-0650. Sandia 
National Laboratories. 
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Homeland-Defense Operational Planning System (HOPS).14 However, although this work 
proposes a matrix for analyzing threat, it addresses facility-specific vulnerabilities rather than 
communication between industry and government regarding generic threats. In addition to 
this work by LLNL, researchers at Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory (INEEL) have proposed the Quantitative Threat-Risk Index Model (QTRIM) to 
compute a quantitative threat-risk index on a system and component level.15 While the 
QTRIM approach may be able to predict the probability of attack on specific facilities, it 
focuses on a threat’s selection of a target, seems to require a great deal of classified 
information, and does not perform the same information sharing service of which a generic 
threat profile would be capable. 
Additional works were consulted during the process of identifying discrete threat attributes 
that can be used to establish the capability of a threat; however, each work focused solely on 
either cyber or kinetic threats and each seemed concerned only with terrorist threat, rather 
than all types of threat: 
• Researchers at LLNL proposed an analytical framework for assessing terrorist 
intentions by considering organizational structure and capabilities.16 Threat profiles 
were linked to specific types of critical infrastructure. 
• As part of a counterterrorism project, the RAND Corporation completed research that 
addressed threat assessment by identifying the character and boundaries of threat and 
proposed a framework to prioritize the threat of terrorist groups by assessing the 
intentions and capabilities of each group.17 
• The United States Army has also committed a great deal of time to the analysis of 
terrorism and the recognition of terrorist threats to U.S. military forces. A Military 
Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century18 and its supplemental handbooks19,20 
are intended to support military training and education on the Global War on 
Terrorism. Although these documents focus solely on terrorist threats, they do stand as 
a strong reference for identifying threat attributes and for case studies of previous 
terrorist attacks. 
Appendix A of this report includes a full bibliography of papers and reports that are relevant 
to this work. 
                                                 
14 Durling, Jr., R. L., Price, D. E., & Spero, K. K. (2005). Vulnerability and risk assessment using the 
Homeland-Defense Operational Planning System (HOPS), UCRL-CONF-209028. International Symposium on 
Systems and Human Science. 
15 Plum, M. M., Gertman, D. I., & Beitel, G.A. (2004). Novel threat-risk index using probabilistic risk 
assessment and human reliability analysis, INEEL/EXT-03-01117. Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory. 
16 Ackerman, G., et al. (2007). Assessing terrorist motivations for attacking critical infrastructure, UCRL-TR-
227068, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
17 Cragin, K., & Daly, S. A. (2004). The dynamic terrorist threat: An assessment of group motivations and 
capabilities in a changing world. RAND, Project AIR FORCE. 
18 A military guide to terrorism in the twenty-first century, TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No. 1. Version 3.0. 
(2005). U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 
19 Terror operations: Case studies in terrorism, DCSINT Handbook No. 1.01. (2005). U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command. 
20 Cyber operations and cyber terrorism, DCSINT Handbook No. 1.02. (2005). U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command. 
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1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this threat characterization research and threat matrix development is to aid in 
the creation of a comprehensive threat analysis framework21 that enables the objective 
determination of threat capabilities and supports the ability to identify and prioritize 
expenditures to mitigate the effects from a class of threats, all in an unclassified venue for 
use by critical infrastructure providers and utility owners. As seen in Figure 1.1, one of the 
primary activities necessary to move classified threat information to the unclassified 
information environment is the development of generic threat profiles that can characterize 
many different levels of threat without associating a name with a classified ability. This 
unclassified threat characterization must be able to bin a full spectrum of threat capability to 
allow for analysts from the classified threat environment to map the characterization of an 
“unnamed” threat to an equivalent bin, or level, of threat in the unclassified threat 
environment. This will then allow analysts in the unclassified environment to identify 
potential attack paths that could be supported by the asserted capability and identify proper 
mitigation steps to thwart attacks. 
                                                 
21 Duggan, D. P., & Michalski, J. T. (2007). Threat analysis framework report, SAND2007-5792. Sandia 
National Laboratories. 
Figure 1.1 Threat Analysis Framework 
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1.2.1 Reason for Investigation 
The reason for this investigation is a combination of historical aspects and the significance of 
the problem being faced today. Although the “threat of the day” is important to understand, it 
is not the only issue in place. While looking at only the current threat, the entire picture can 
become skewed based on assumptions that follow names of organizations due to statements 
of the media and personal opinion. These assumptions do not allow for the objective 
differentiation of threats. Creating a generic threat matrix not only removes the assumptions 
that come with names, but also includes those types of organizations that are not the primary 
focus of a day, month, year, or decade.  
A generic threat matrix also allows for intelligence organizations and other government 
entities to communicate threat information easily, and without classification issues, by 
removing the details of threat information that require classification such as how the threat 
information was obtained, while still capturing its level of commitment and capability. In this 
way, government entities, such as intelligence organizations, and critical infrastructure 
entities, such as utility owners, will be able to communicate with fewer barriers and, in the 
end, be able to provide a more secure and reliable infrastructure than exists today. 
1.2.2 Roadmap Challenges 
As referenced in the Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector22 publication, 
control systems are evolving from isolated operating environments using proprietary 
software, hardware, and communications technologies toward scalable inter-connected 
architectures using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and standards-based protocols 
that provide high levels of interoperability. High connectivity and interoperability comes 
with a significant security risk. This risk must be managed and, as part of an overall threat 
analysis framework, threat identification and categorization is an integral part of the overall 
risk management process. 
1.2.3 Audience 
This report aims to provide the U.S. Government, including DOE, with a means to 
communicate to energy-related critical infrastructure providers and utility owners, in a non-
classified manner, the dangers they face from potential threats and possible mitigation 
strategies of those dangers. By applying the generic threat matrix, government entities will be 
able to inform critical infrastructure entities about which types of threats they should be 
concerned and what resources (personnel, knowledge, and access) those threats may have at 
their disposal, without violating the classification of the original information source. This 
work is designed to be understood by both government and critical infrastructure entities to 
allow both to communicate with a common vocabulary and the same basic understanding of 
possible threats. 
1.2.4 Desired Response 
The primary intention of this report is employment of the generic threat matrix by 
government entities to share unclassified actionable threat information with critical 
infrastructure providers and utility owners. In addition to this, the information shared will 
                                                 
22 Eisenhauer, J., et al. (2006). Roadmap to secure control systems in the energy sector. Energetics Incorporated. 
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allow government and critical infrastructure entities to work together to identify possible 
attack paths and develop appropriate mitigation strategies for those paths. This will help U.S. 
critical infrastructure become more secure, as well as enable utility owners and providers to 
become more aware of potential threats in the future.  
To keep this generic threat matrix from becoming obsolete, periodic updates should be 
applied to the matrix, keeping it in line with the current notion of threat. This may include 
changing levels of threat or adding new columns to represent a new category of capability. 
Also, data mining techniques can be used to verify the continued accuracy and relevancy of 
the threat profiles. 
1.3 Scope 
To provide an overall threat analysis capability, researchers at SNL are developing a threat 
analysis framework that employs the important elements necessary to identify, characterize, 
and mitigate the effects of a threat. As previously demonstrated in Figure 1.1, one of the most 
important elements needed for unclassified threat analysis is the identification of a threat’s 
capability to carry out a specific type of attack. Current analysis methods tend to concentrate 
on more subjective aspects of political and social motivation structures without identifying 
relevant objective characteristics that may be used in identifying attacks each threat might be 
able to perform. As the focus of this work, which is part of the development of an overall 
threat analysis framework, a generic set of threat profiles was created to categorize threats. 
This helps to quantify the threat’s ability to conduct both cyber and kinetic operations against 
a critical infrastructure entity’s assets. There is currently no other documented work in the 
area of threat characterization that is developing generic threat profiles to solve this problem 
for all systems, whether cyber or physical. Other solutions are reactive in nature, to a specific 
threat on a specific type of system, while this approach allows the energy-related critical 
infrastructure provider and utility owner to be proactive. 
1.3.1 Extent and Limits of Investigation 
For the purposes of this report, the topic will be limited to threats of a malevolent nature 
only, using generic threat profiles to categorize threats employing cyber, kinetic, and hybrid 
means against any system, cyber or physical. Although the inputs to this particular work were 
unclassified open-source materials, previous iterations of the generic threat matrix23 were 
validated using a wide variety of source materials. 
1.3.2 Goals 
The goal of this work is the development of a set of generic threat profiles that can be used to 
identify and characterize the different levels of adversaries and their related capabilities. 
These capability profiles allow for unclassified actionable threat information to be distributed 
to potential stakeholders, such as energy-related critical infrastructure providers and utility 
owners. 
                                                 
23 Duggan, D. P. (2005). Generic threat profiles, SAND2005-5411. Sandia National Laboratories. 
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1.3.3 Objectives 
To achieve the goal of this work, the following objectives were accomplished: 
• Identify and define common threat attributes. This report includes a discussion 
of each discrete threat attribute and the scale used to determine a threat’s profile 
level. 
• Develop the generic threat matrix.  This report identifies and characterizes the 
different levels of adversaries and their capabilities to leverage attacks against 
critical infrastructure assets. 
• Validate the generic threat matrix. This report includes a short discussion of the 
applicability of threat level profiles to previously occurring events and the 
discovered or inferred capabilities of the adversary involved. 
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2 Approach 
This work used a qualitative research approach to create the generic threat matrix. That is, 
the analysis used to determine the nature of the attributes and behavior of the threat being 
measured was based on professional judgment, not quantitative data. This approach involved 
background research from open-source material (including literature surveys and case 
studies), the generation of a matrix of generic threat profiles, and the validation of the matrix 
against real-world data. 
2.1 Methods 
The methods employed to create the generic threat matrix included literature surveys and 
case studies. These sources were used for background research that provided information on 
the passion and capabilities that have historically been displayed by threat organizations and 
individuals.  
The literature study included papers on threat matrices and threat characterization created by 
other agencies. Most of these studies focused on the characteristics of executed attacks, but 
they did provide some knowledge of what capabilities the organization needed to carry out 
those attacks. Other literature sources were government papers or presentations analyzing 
specific attacks24 and generalized organizational capabilities and composition.25, 26  
Due to the often classified nature of the specific abilities of a threat, case studies were used to 
develop an in-depth understanding of common threat capabilities. These case studies came 
from newspaper reports and databases that catalogue terrorist attacks and organizations. The 
MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base25 was a particular asset in gaining information on terrorist 
threats.  
With the knowledge garnered from background research, educated summations were 
extracted and employed in the creation of the generic threat matrix. 
2.2 Assumptions 
This investigation involved the following assumptions: 
• Current threat analysis focuses on the “threat of the day.” 
• Analysis of higher-level threats often happens in a classified environment. 
• There is need for the communication of unclassified actionable threat information 
to critical infrastructure providers and utility owners. 
                                                 
24 “Anatomy of a terrorist attack: An in-depth investigation into the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania.” (2005). The Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the 
University of Pittsburgh. 
25 “MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB).” (2007). www.tkb.org. 
26 Criminal Intelligence Service Canada. (2006). 2006 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada. Her 
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada. 
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• Advancing technology will boost both cyber and kinetic skills throughout society. 
• Threats will continue moving toward hybrid cyber-kinetic attack approaches. 
• It is not feasible to catalogue every possible cyber, kinetic, and hybrid threat. 
2.3 Procedures 
This investigation was completed using the following procedures: 
• Identify and define common threat attributes. 
a. Identify discrete threat attributes.  
b. Establish a scale for each attribute that can be used to assign a threat’s capability. 
• Develop the generic threat matrix. 
a. Use common threat attributes to characterize generic threat profiles. 
• Validate the generic threat matrix. 
a. Conduct background research to include literature surveys and case studies. 
b. Determine characteristic levels of threats found during background research. 
c. Verify the applicability of the matrix for categorizing threat. 
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3 Results and Discussion 
This section begins with the definitions and a characterization of the common threat 
attributes and then presents the generic threat matrix developed by this work. It is important 
to remember that the matrix includes only attributes of a malevolent threat.  Threats of a 
normal or abnormal nature should be analyzed and mitigated from a functional or safety 
perspective, rather than a security perspective. 
3.1 Threat Attributes 
A threat attribute is a discrete characteristic, or distinguishing property, of a threat. The 
combined characteristics of a threat describe the threat’s willingness and ability to pursue its 
goal. However, both willingness and ability are defined by multiple, separate attributes. The 
intent of this delineation of attributes is that each defines a distinctive characteristic of a 
threat and there are no inherent dependencies between any two threat attributes.  
There are two families of threat attributes: commitment attributes that describe the threat’s 
willingness and resource attributes that describe the threat’s ability. 
3.1.1 Commitment Attribute Family 
Commitment attributes are the characteristics of a threat that quantify the threat’s willingness 
to pursue its goal. Characteristics of commitment are indicative of a threat’s capability 
because they exemplify the drive of the threat to accomplish its goal. Those threats with the 
highest commitment will stop at nothing in pursuit of the goal, while those with lower overall 
commitment will not share such drive and ambition.  
There are three attributes in the commitment family: Intensity, Stealth, and Time. 
3.1.1.1 Intensity 
The threat attribute of Intensity describes the diligence, or persevering determination, of a 
threat in the pursuit of its goal. This attribute also includes the passion felt by the threat for 
its goal. Intensity is a measure of how far a threat is willing to go and what a threat is willing 
to risk to accomplish its goal. Threats with higher intensity are, therefore, considered more 
dangerous because of their driving ambition in pursuit of a goal. 
There are three levels of Intensity: 
• High (H): The threat is highly determined to pursue its goal and is willing to accept 
any and all consequences resulting from that pursuit. Acceptable consequences may 
include imprisonment or the death of organization members or innocent bystanders. 
The threat may be described as fanatical. 
• Medium (M): The threat is moderately determined to pursue its goal and is willing to 
accept some negative consequences resulting from that pursuit. Acceptable 
consequences may include imprisonment, but usually not the death of group members 
or innocent bystanders. 
Categorizing Threat: Building and Using a Generic Threat Matrix 
 20 
• Low (L): The threat is determined to pursue its goal, but is not willing to accept 
negative consequences, such as imprisonment or death, from the pursuit of its goal. 
3.1.1.2 Stealth 
The threat attribute of Stealth describes the ability of the threat to maintain a necessary level 
of secrecy throughout the pursuit of its goal.  The maintenance of secrecy may require the 
ability to obscure any or all details about the threat organization, including its goal, its 
structure, or its internal operations. A higher level of stealth allows a threat to hide its 
intended activities, as well as its internal structure, from the outside world. This hinders 
intelligence gathering and pre-emptive measures to counter, or prevent, attacks by the threat. 
There are three levels of Stealth: 
• High (H): The threat is highly capable of maintaining a necessary level of secrecy in 
pursuit of its goal. 
• Medium (M): The threat is moderately capable of maintaining a necessary level of 
secrecy in pursuit of its goal, but is not able to completely obscure details about the 
threat organization or its internal operations. 
• Low (L): The threat is not capable of maintaining a necessary level of secrecy in 
pursuit of its goal and is not able to obscure details about the threat organization or its 
internal operations. 
3.1.1.3 Time 
The threat attribute of Time quantifies the period of time that a threat is capable of dedicating 
to planning, developing, and deploying methods to reach an objective. In the case of a cyber 
or kinetic attack, it includes any time necessary for all steps of implementation up to actual 
execution. The more time a threat is willing and able to commit to preparing an attack, the 
more potential the threat has for devastating impacts. 
There are four levels of Time: 
• Years to Decades: The threat is capable of dedicating many, many years to planning, 
developing, and deploying methods to reach an objective. 
• Months to Years: The threat is capable of dedicating several years to planning, 
developing, and deploying methods to reach an objective. 
• Weeks to Months: The threat is capable of dedicating several months to planning, 
developing, and deploying methods to reach an objective. 
• Days to Weeks: The threat is capable of dedicating several days up to a few weeks to 
planning, developing, and deploying methods to reach an objective. 
3.1.2 Resource Attribute Family 
Resource attributes are the characteristics of a threat that quantify the people, knowledge, and 
access available to a threat for pursuing its goal. Characteristics of resource are indicative of 
a threat’s capability because greater resources may allow a threat to accomplish an objective 
or goal more easily and with greater overall adaptability.  
There are three attributes in the resource family: Personnel, Knowledge, and Access. 
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3.1.2.1 Technical Personnel 
The threat attribute of Technical Personnel quantifies the number of group members that a 
threat is capable of dedicating to the building and deployment of the technical capability in 
pursuit of its goal. Technical Personnel includes only group members with specific types of 
knowledge or skills, such as kinetic or cyber, and those directly involved with the actual 
fabrication of the group’s weapons. A threat with a higher level of Technical Personnel has 
greater potential for innovative design and development, allowing for the possibility of new 
methods of reaching a goal that may not have been available in the past. In addition, a higher 
level of technical personnel also expedites the design and development of a threat’s plans for 
attack. 
There are four levels of Technical Personnel: 
• Hundreds: The threat is capable of dedicating one to many hundreds of individuals to 
provide the technical capability of building and deploying weapons. These individuals 
have full communication between them for all design, development, and fabrication 
work. 
• Tens of Tens: The threat is capable of dedicating multiple small groups of individuals 
to provide the technical capability of building and deploying weapons. These groups 
have only limited communication between groups, but there is full communication 
within the groups themselves. 
• Tens: The threat is capable of dedicating a small, independent group of individuals to 
provide the technical capability of building and deploying weapons. There is full 
communication between the members of the group. 
• Ones: The threat is capable of dedicating one to several individuals to provide the 
technical capability of building and deploying weapons. There is full communication 
between the individuals. 
The designation given to each level of Technical Personnel (e.g., Ones or Hundreds) is 
intended as a relative measure only and does not necessarily limit or enumerate the actual 
physical count of active members in a threat organization. For example, a malevolent 
organization with a thousand members may have only fifty technical personnel capable of 
building and deploying weapons. Depending on the structure of the organization, the threat 
would have a Technical Personnel capability of only Tens or Tens of Tens. 
3.1.2.2 Knowledge 
The threat attribute of Knowledge defines the threat’s level of theoretical and practical 
proficiency and the threat’s capability of employing that proficiency in pursuit of its goal. 
Knowledge also includes the ability of a threat to share information, acquire training in a 
necessary discipline, and maintain a research and development program. However, this 
attribute does not include any proficiency found or purchased outside the threat organization.  
This attribute includes knowledge pertaining to both an offensive and defensive capability 
within the category. The greater the knowledge of a threat as a whole, the more capability a 
threat has to pursue its goal with fewer resources and in less time. Also, a threat’s knowledge 
provides a means to differentiate between threats that are cyber-, kinetic-, or hybrid-based. 
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There are two basic categories of Knowledge: 
• Cyber Knowledge: The theoretical and practical proficiency relating to computers, 
information networks, or automated systems. 
• Kinetic Knowledge: The theoretical and practical proficiency relating to physical 
systems, the motion of physical bodies, and the forces associated with that movement. 
Inside each category, there are three levels of Knowledge: 
• High (H): The threat is capable of using expert proficiency—both theoretical and 
practical—in pursuit of its goal. The threat is able to participate in information sharing 
and is capable of maintaining a training program, as well as a research and 
development program. 
• Medium (M): The threat is capable of using intermediate proficiency in pursuit of its 
goal. Intermediate proficiency can be described as being highly practical knowledge 
supported by a low or moderate amount of theoretical knowledge. The threat is able to 
participate in limited information sharing and is capable of providing and acquiring 
training, as opposed to education; however, the threat is not capable of maintaining a 
research and development program of its own. 
• Low (L): The threat is capable of using novice proficiency in pursuit of its goal. 
Novice proficiency consists of a low to moderate amount of practical knowledge and 
little to no theoretical knowledge. The threat does not have the capability to share 
information, provide training, or maintain a research and development program. 
3.1.2.3 Access 
The threat attribute of Access defines a threat’s ability to place a group member within a 
restricted system—whether through cyber or kinetic means—in pursuit of the threat’s goal. A 
restricted system is considered to be any system, whether cyber or physical, where access is 
granted based on privileges or credentials. The characteristic of Access details a threat’s 
ability to infiltrate a restricted system, whether through a privileged group member, the 
blackmail and coercion of an innocent bystander, or the corruption of an under-protected 
network or computer system. Infiltration by a threat can lead to a wide variety of effects: the 
need for fewer resources to achieve an objective, the implementation of a long-term scheme 
of product-tampering, or an increased level of intimate knowledge of a target. 
There are three levels of Access: 
• High (H): The threat is able to plan and place a group member with direct or 
unlimited access within a restricted system. 
• Medium (M): The threat is able to plan and place a group member with indirect or 
limited access within a restricted system. 
• Low (L): The threat is not able to plan and place a group member within a restricted 
system. 
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3.2 Generic Threat Profiles 
Using the attributes of threat defined above, generic threat profiles were generated. While it 
is impossible to consistently capture each distinct type of threat, the generic threat matrix 
(Table 3.1) enables government entities and intelligence organizations to categorize threat 
into a common vocabulary. Government organizations, such as SNL and DOE/OE, can use 
these profiles to identify potential attack paths and initial mitigation strategies. Critical 
infrastructure entities, such as utility owners and operators, can then use those mitigation 
strategies to implement actual mitigation plans, specific to their system architectures, to 
protect infrastructure assets.  
Table 3.1 Generic Threat Matrix 
 
THREAT PROFILE 
 
COMMITMENT RESOURCES 
KNOWLEDGE 
THREAT 
LEVEL 
 INTENSITY STEALTH TIME 
TECHNICAL 
PERSONNEL CYBER KINETIC ACCESS 
1 H H Years to Decades Hundreds H H H 
2 H H Years to Decades Tens of Tens M H M 
3 H H Months to Years Tens of Tens H M M 
4 M H Weeks to Months Tens H M M 
5 H M Weeks to Months Tens M M M 
6 M M Weeks to Months Ones M M L 
7 M M Months to Years Tens L L L 
8 L L Days to Weeks Ones L L L 
Threat Level 1 will always be the most capable of achieving an objective or goal, while 
Threat Level 8 is the least capable. There are at least three different attribute levels between 
each subsequent threat profile in the matrix; for lower-level threats (levels 6 through 8), there 
are four different attribute levels. In general, each threat level from Level 8 to Level 1 
represents a more dangerous threat than the previous level. Although a Level 8 threat may be 
able to attain the same objective as a Level 1 threat, it will be through an unprotected 
vulnerability of an asset, the fortuitous timing of an attack, or simple luck, rather than a 
capability characteristic possessed by the threat organization. 
It is possible, indeed likely, that at least one specific threat—out of the full spectrum of 
threat—will not fit exactly into a specific Threat Level. In this case, the threat should be 
categorized into the level which has the most similar threat profile. This is the very reason 
that the generic threat matrix has been designed with levels-of-magnitude difference between 
subsequent threat levels: to ensure that a threat is not equally similar to two adjacent levels. 
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3.2.1 Observations 
There are several observations that can be made on review of the generic threat matrix. First, 
there are two boundary conditions necessary for establishing viable threat profiles: 
• Threats with a Threat Level 1 profile will always have the highest capability within 
each attribute. 
• Threats with the highest numbered level (Level 8 in this matrix) will always have the 
lowest capability within each attribute. 
Second, a threat’s level of Technical Personnel can aid in understanding a threat’s other 
attributes: 
• Threats with more Technical Personnel will necessarily have greater Intensity, 
Knowledge, and Access. This is based on the assumption that more personnel create 
more viable opportunities. 
• Threats with a Technical Personnel level of Ones will not have high Knowledge, 
because these threats have little capacity for information sharing or research and 
development programs. 
• Threats with Technical Personnel level of Ones will not have high Intensity, because 
these threats are not likely to be self-sacrificing. 
The level of Knowledge possessed by a threat organization also follows an observable 
pattern: 
• Threats with high Cyber Knowledge will not have low Kinetic Knowledge—and vice-
versa—because of the application of expert proficiency in both theoretical and 
practical domains. 
A final observation can be made regarding a threat organization’s capability for Access: 
• Threats with high Knowledge—Cyber or Kinetic—will have at least medium Access 
due to the assumption that it is easier to attain and harder to detect access achieved 
through expert proficiency. 
3.2.2 Multipliers 
There are some properties of threats that, while not distinctive characteristics, can affect one 
or more threat attributes; they can enhance a threat’s capabilities, but do not affect the 
threat’s profile level. Three of these multipliers are Funding, Assets, and Technology. 
3.2.2.1 Funding 
Funding, the monetary support available to a threat, has historically been used to define the 
capability of threat groups; however, because the value of currency fluctuates over time, it is 
a difficult factor to translate into actual capability. As a multiplier, Funding can be used to 
enhance certain threat attributes, such as Knowledge or Access. On the other hand, it can also 
reduce the level of a threat attribute such as Stealth—the purchase of greater knowledge or 
increased access may make an organization more detectable because it is using outside 
resources. 
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3.2.2.2 Assets 
The multiplier of Assets is similar to that of Funding above. It can enhance a threat’s ability 
to carry out its mission, but can be a difficult factor to translate into actual capability. It is 
defined as a threat’s ability to have, build, or acquire the equipment, tools, and material 
necessary for the pursuit of its goal. 
3.2.2.3 Technology 
The type of technology that a threat is capable of utilizing or targeting in pursuit of its goal 
can be a limiting factor on certain threat attributes, such as Time and Knowledge. The fast-
paced, dynamic nature of some technology and its development requires up-to-date 
knowledge and quick implementation or application. 
3.3 Validation of the Generic Threat Matrix 
During this work, two methods were employed to validate the applicability of the generic 
threat matrix. The first was an attack tree analysis to verify the mutual independence of the 
discrete threat attributes. In addition to establishing variable independence, a series of case 
studies was performed to verify that a broad range of threat can be binned into the generic 
threat matrix. 
3.3.1 Attack Tree Analysis 
The generic threat matrix developed by this project is already being used in attack tree 
analysis by another research team at Sandia National Laboratories. That team is identifying 
attack paths against cargo shipments and requires a method for connecting threats to attack 
paths based on capability profiles; this is achieved using attack tree analysis. 
Basic attack tree analysis relies on three classes of information:  
1. the events an adversary must undertake to achieve a goal, 
2. the parameters associated with these events, and 
3. the capabilities of the adversary. 
Successful attack tree analysis requires well-defined parameters and capabilities. These 
should be relatively complete and orthogonal. Incomplete or overlapping parameters and 
capabilities hinder analysis of the attack tree. Further, when parameters and capabilities vary 
too much across assessments, comparison becomes increasingly difficult. 
Through the attack tree analysis, the attributes and threat profiles developed by this project 
were found to be both complete and orthogonal; the set of capabilities was found to span the 
entire “capability space” and each capability was non-overlapping or mutually independent 
of the others. By providing this set of off-the-shelf parameters and capabilities, the generic 
threat matrix allows the attack tree analyst to save time and achieve accurate, consistent 
analysis. 
3.3.2 Case Studies 
A series of short case studies was performed to validate the applicability of threat level 
profiles to previously occurring events and the discovered or conjectured capabilities of the 
adversary involved. The following three examples demonstrate this process. 
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3.3.2.1 High-level Threat 
On April 27, 2007, in the face of disapproval by ethnic Russians, the Estonian government 
relocated a Soviet war memorial from the center of Tallinn, the Estonian capital city, to a 
military cemetery. This move sparked rioting, looting and a least a two-month attack on 
Estonian cyber resources.27 As reported by several news resources,28,29 the country of Estonia 
was subjected to massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks targeted at websites of 
government ministries, political parties, newspapers, banks, and communication companies. 
Many of the attacks came from ordinary computers, partially thanks to anonymously posted 
instructions, on Russian-language internet sites, on how to launch DDoS attacks. Estonia was 
forced to prohibit access to its websites from abroad, an action that caused a potentially huge 
impact on the country’s economy.27  
BBC News reported that the Estonian foreign ministry published a list of IP addresses from 
which the DDoS attacks originated; the list included addresses in the Russian government 
and presidential administration.30,31 However, as stated by a Kremlin spokesman, “[I]t does 
not mean that foreign governments are behind these attacks. Moreover, as you probably 
know, IP address can be fake.”30 This type of sustained cyber-attack against a state’s critical 
infrastructure may be the first known incident of such an assault; if the Estonian government 
were ever able to attribute the attacks to Russia, it would be the first known case of one state 
targeting another through cyber-warfare.32  
These types of attacks, particularly if they were the result of state-on-state cyber-warfare, 
could be perpetrated by a high-level threat. As seen in Figure 3.2, a high-level threat may 
match to a Level 1, 2, or 3 profile, which consists of high and medium capabilities. Based on 
the sustained nature of the attacks, and the type of event that triggered them, the threat is 
assumed to have a high-level of Intensity, even though the attack did not result in loss of life. 
The fact that the attacks were cyber-based and effective against a wide-variety of high-
security targets, leads to the assumption that the threat has a high-level of Stealth, and at least 
medium levels of Knowledge and Access. The types of attacks pursued (e.g., website-
defacing by groups or individuals and DDoS attacks employing botnets) and the level of 
information sharing involved suggests that the threat has a Technical Personnel contingent of 
at least Tens of Tens.  
                                                 
27 “Estonia and Russia: A cyber-riot.” (2007). The Economist.  
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9163598 Accessed July 19, 2007. 
28 “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia.” (2007). The Guardian. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2081438,00.html.  Accessed July 27, 2007. 
29 “Cyber assaults on Estonia typify a new battle tactic.” (2007). The Washington Post. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/18/AR2007051802122_pf.html. Accessed July 
27, 2007. 
30 “The cyber raiders hitting Estonia.” (2007). BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665195.stm. 
Accessed July 27, 2007. 
31 “Estonia hit by ‘Moscow cyber war.’” (2007). BBC News.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm. Accessed July 27, 2007. 
32 “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia.” (2007). The Guardian. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2081438,00.html. Accessed July 27, 2007. 
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It is important to remember that the Estonian government was never able to attribute these 
attacks to another state. This analysis of the responsibility party as a high-level threat is based 
solely on information gathered from news sources under the assumption that the attacks were 
the result of a single organization. If, instead, the attacks came from multiple, separate threats 
with the same objective or goal, the analysis would need to be reformulated for each 
individual threat. 
Table 3.2 High-level Threat Profiles 
 
 
THREAT PROFILE 
 
COMMITMENT RESOURCES 
KNOWLEDGE 
THREAT 
LEVEL 
 INTENSITY STEALTH TIME 
TECHNICAL 
PERSONNEL CYBER KINETIC ACCESS 
1 H H Years to Decades Hundreds H H H 
2 H H Years to Decades Tens of Tens M H M 
3 H H Months to Years Tens of Tens H M M 
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3.3.2.2 Mid-level Threat 
In December of 2002, Joseph Konopka, also known as “Dr. Chaos”, pleaded guilty to six 
federal felonies including conspiracy, arson, creating counterfeit software, and interfering 
with computers.33 After Konopka’s arrest in January 2001, the number of power failures 
caused by vandalism in the affected region dropped from 28 to zero, and the number of 
minor arsons dropped from more than 200 to a handful. Konopka recruited followers through 
a chat room called “Teens For Satan” and the group, often known as “The Realm of Chaos” 
is believed responsible for setting numerous grass fires, vandalizing power substations, 
damaging communication equipment, and igniting chemicals under gas pipes; damages have 
been estimated at $2.5 million to $3 million.34 
The type of attacks perpetrated by Konopka could be the result of a mid-level threat. As seen 
in Figure 3.3, a mid-level threat has mostly medium capabilities. Although Konopka called 
himself an anarchist, he claimed that he pursued attacks against utility and communication 
infrastructure simply because he felt “a sense of intellectual superiority.”33 This type of 
determination or purpose results in a medium level of Intensity. These types of attacks 
require at least a medium level of Knowledge of both cyber and physical systems and a low 
to medium level of Access to restricted systems. In addition, the attacks can be conducted 
with a fairly small contingent of Technical Personnel with limited planning and development 
Time. While Konopka himself may be classified as a Level 6 threat, these types of attacks 
may be pursued by any mid-level threat. 
Table 3.3 Mid-level Threat Profiles 
 
                                                 
33 Barton, G. (2002). “‘Dr. Chaos’ says crime spree was result of ‘intellectual superiority.’” The Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4196/is_20021221/ai_10826333. Accessed July 19, 
2007. 
34 Jones, M., & Held, T. (2002). “Lost months of ‘Dr. Chaos’ interest police: Cyanide suspect disappeared in 
June.” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=26946. Accessed July 
19, 2007. 
 
THREAT PROFILE 
 
COMMITMENT RESOURCES 
KNOWLEDGE 
THREAT 
LEVEL 
 INTENSITY STEALTH TIME 
TECHNICAL 
PERSONNEL CYBER KINETIC ACCESS 
4 M H Weeks to Months Tens H M M 
5 H M Weeks to Months Tens M M M 
6 M M Weeks to Months Ones M M L 
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3.3.2.3 Low-level Threat 
There have been several incidents of sabotage and vandalism against electric facilities over 
the last few years: 
• On March 21, 2004, vandals in Prineville, Oregon, disabled a Bonneville Power 
Administration interstate transmission line.35 Extensive damage from gunfire put two 
towers carrying a direct-current transmission line out of service for eight hours. The 
repairs to the line cost approximately $10,000. 
• In May of 2006, a high-voltage electrical facility owned by Western Area Power 
Administration in Henderson, Nevada, was the target of vandals who cut the fence 
surrounding the facility and stole aluminum and copper cable from the site.36 Incidents 
like these can contribute to higher operation and maintenance costs. 
• On October 20, 2006, Appalachian Power announced a reward for information 
involving vandalism to or theft from the company’s electrical facilities. The company 
reported that each year near Halloween, vandals in rural southern West Virginia cut 
trees so that they fall on top of power lines. In the two weeks prior to this 
announcement, vandalism caused the loss of power in four separate counties, affecting 
thousands of customers.37 
As seen in Figure 3.4, this type of seemingly-random vandalism, or sabotage, is often caused 
by a low-level threat due to the relatively low capabilities demonstrated by the responsible 
party. 
Table 3.4 Low-level Threat Profiles 
 
                                                 
35 “Reward offered for spring vacation power line vandals.” (2004). Bonneville Power Administration. 
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/kc/media/NewsRelease.cfm?ReleaseNo=453. Accessed May 30, 2007. 
36 “Help Western combat vandalism at Henderson electric facility.” (2006). Western Area Power 
Administration. http://www.wapa.gov/newsroom/NewsRelease/2006/060106_HendesonVandalism.htm. 
Accessed July 27, 2007. 
37 “Appalachian Power offers reward for information on vandals, thieves.” (2006). Appalachian Power. 
http://www.appalachianpower.com/news/releases/viewrelease.asp?releaseID=322. Accessed July 27, 2007. 
 
THREAT PROFILE 
 
COMMITMENT RESOURCES 
KNOWLEDGE 
THREAT 
LEVEL 
 INTENSITY STEALTH TIME 
TECHNICAL 
PERSONNEL CYBER KINETIC ACCESS 
7 M M Months to Years Tens L L L 
8 L L Days to Weeks Ones L L L 
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4 Conclusions 
The key piece of knowledge necessary for building defenses capable of withstanding or 
surviving cyber and kinetic attacks is an understanding of the capabilities posed by threats to 
both cyber and physical systems, such as SCADA systems used to control the physical 
processes of critical infrastructure assets. However, current methodologies for analyzing 
high-level threat do not provide government entities, such as the Department of Energy and 
intelligence organizations, with an effective means for sharing unclassified actionable threat 
information with critical infrastructure entities, such as utility owners and operators. There is 
need for a common vocabulary that can be used by both government and industry to 
communicate about threat capability while still protecting the classified information source. 
With the number of threats continuing to increase, it is no longer feasible to enumerate the 
capabilities of all known threats and then build defenses based on those threats that are 
considered, at the time, to be most relevant. To reduce the complexity of the threat space 
while protecting classified sources, an abstraction must be created to allow all threats to be 
grouped into a small number of distinctly different levels, based on measurable capabilities. 
The generic threat matrix proposed in this report abstracts the continuous threat space into 
eight discrete levels; each level has a specific profile based on quantifiable attributes of 
Intensity, Stealth, Time, Technical Personnel, Cyber and Kinetic Knowledge, and Access. 
The magnitude of difference between each level in the generic threat matrix ensures that 
every unique threat can be catalogued into one specific threat level that defines the threat’s 
ability to pursue a class of attacks.  
As part of an overall threat analysis framework, the generic threat matrix allows government 
and critical infrastructure entities to identify potential attack paths based on a specific threat 
capability profile, develop mitigation strategies for those attacks, and implement defenses to 
thwart both the attack and the threat. Through this sharing of actionable threat information, 
not only will utility owners and operators become more aware of potential vulnerabilities in 
their related infrastructure, but the overall critical infrastructure of the United States will 
become more secure and reliable. 
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5 Recommendations 
The historical approach to dealing with threat by identifying each unique threat and learning 
its particular capabilities, then identifying protection mechanisms to be implemented, does 
not work well as the number of these threats increases. The generic threat matrix, as part of 
an overall threat analysis framework, provides a new method for objective quantification of 
threat capabilities. This method allows for the transfer of threat capability information to the 
unclassified domain where it can then be used by analysts to identify potential attack paths 
that could be supported by the asserted capability and proper mitigation steps to thwart 
attacks. 
This report provides the U.S. Government, including the Department of Energy (DOE), with 
a means to communicate to critical infrastructure providers and utility owners, in a non-
classified manner, the dangers they face from potential threats and possible mitigation 
strategies of those dangers. The generic threat matrix allows for intelligence organizations 
and other government entities to communicate threat information easily, and without 
classification issues, by removing the details of a threat, while still capturing its level of 
commitment and capability. In this way, government entities, such as DOE, and critical 
infrastructure entities, such as utility owners, are able to communicate with fewer barriers 
and, in the end, are able to provide a more secure and reliable infrastructure than exists today. 
This work is designed to be understood by both government and critical infrastructure 
entities to allow both to communicate with a common vocabulary and the same basic 
understanding of possible threats. The generic threat matrix, as part of an overall threat 
analysis framework, should be used by 
• government entities to communicate with industry regarding the nature of threats 
while still protecting classified information sources; 
• threat analysts to identify potential attack paths based on threat capability and to 
suggest mitigation strategies relevant to those attacks; and 
• critical infrastructure entities to identify and prioritize expenditures for mitigation 
solutions. 
In order to ensure the continued validity of the generic threat matrix, work should continue to 
be funded to provide greater detail in the capability portions of the matrix and their 
connection with mitigation design and implementation. This further detail will enable the 
integration of the generic threat matrix into future attack path research. In addition, the 
adoption and integration of the overall threat analysis framework will allow critical 
infrastructure and government entities to be proactive in ensuring the security and reliability 
of infrastructure assets. 
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Appendix B: Acronyms 
COTS commercial off-the-shelf 
DOE Department of Energy 
DOE/OE Department of Energy Office of Electricity 
DDoS distributed denial-of-service 
HOPS Homeland-Defense Operational Planning System 
INL or 
INEEL 
Idaho National Laboratory, previously known as Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
MIPT Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
QTRIM Quantitative Threat-Risk Index Model 
SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition 
SNL Sandia National Laboratories 
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Appendix C: Glossary 
access The attribute of a threat that defines the threat’s ability to place a 
group member within a restricted system—whether through cyber or 
kinetic means—in pursuit of the threat’s goal. 
actionable 
information 
Information that allows a decision to be made or an action to be 
taken. 
assets The threat’s ability to have, build, or acquire the equipment, tools, 
and material necessary for the pursuit of its goal. 
attack path The sequence of steps and accesses necessary to complete an assault 
on a target. 
attribute A discrete characteristic or distinguishing property, of a threat. 
commitment The attributes of a threat that qualify the threat’s willingness to 
pursue its goal. 
critical 
infrastructure 
Those systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems 
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of 
those matters.38 
funding The monetary support available to a threat for the pursuit of its goal. 
goal The threat’s overall intent or the end-result the threat is trying to 
achieve. 
intensity The attribute of a threat that describes the diligence, or persevering 
determination, of a threat in the pursuit of its goal. 
knowledge The attribute of a threat that defines the threat’s level of theoretical 
and practical proficiency and the threat’s capability of employing 
that proficiency in pursuit of its goal; knowledge includes the ability 
of a threat to share information, acquire training in a necessary 
discipline, and maintain a research and development program. 
knowledge, cyber The theoretical and practical proficiency relating to computers or 
automated systems. 
knowledge, kinetic The theoretical and practical proficiency relating to physical systems 
or the motion of physical bodies and the forces associated with that 
movement. 
mitigation strategy A set of design criteria for a system that is intended to enable the 
system to overcome or survive a particular type of event. 
                                                 
38 National Strategy for Homeland Security. (2002). Office of Homeland Security. 
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multipliers The properties of a threat that, while not distinctive characteristics, 
can affect one or more threat attributes; they can enhance a threat’s 
capabilities, but do not affect the threat’s profile level. 
objective A task, such as a specific attack, that a threat must accomplish to 
progress toward the goal. 
resources The attributes of a threat that quantify the people, knowledge, and 
access available to a threat for pursuing its goal. 
stealth The attribute of a threat that describes the ability of a threat to 
maintain a necessary level of throughout the pursuit of its goal. 
technical personnel The attribute of a threat that quantifies the number of group 
members that a threat is capable of dedicating to the building and 
deployment of the technical capability in pursuit of its goal. 
threat A malevolent actor, whether an organization or an individual, with a 
specific political, social, or personal goal and some level of 
capability and intention to oppose an established government, a 
private organization, or an accepted social norm. 
threat, abnormal A natural disaster, such as hurricane-force winds or earthquakes, 
resulting in the failure of structural steel frames.40 
threat, malevolent A manmade event or condition; for example, a bombing of a federal 
facility or the use of chemical and biological agents in terrorist 
attacks.40 
threat, normal An event or condition that affects the reliability of the day-to-day 
operations; for example, the mean time between failures or 
inefficient repair and replacement (maintenance) schedules to offset 
the effects of aging.39 
time The attribute of a threat that quantifies the period of time that a 
threat is capable of dedicating to planning, developing, and 
deploying methods to reach an objective. 
                                                 
39 Matalucci, R. V., & O’Connor, S. (2000). Infrastructure and Architectural SuretySM. Materials Research 
Society: When Materials Matter—Analyzing, Predicting and Preventing Disasters. 630, GG1.3.1-9. 
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Appendix D: For More Information 
NSTB (National SCADA 
Testbed) Project 
Jennifer DePoy, manager, Critical Infrastructure Systems, 
Sandia National Laboratories, jdepoy@sandia.gov. 
ieRoadmap 
 
http://www.energetics.com/csroadmap/index.aspx  
Interactive Energy Roadmap to Secure Control Systems 
Energetics Incorporated 
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